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Political Contestation in Global Production Networks
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a critical framework on international management and production
that draws from the literatures on global commodity chains and global production
networks (GPNs), from institutional entrepreneurship, as well as from neo-Gramscian
theory in international political economy. The framework views GPNs as integrated
economic, political, and discursive systems, in which market and political power are
intertwined. The framework highlights the contingent stability of GPNs as well as the
potential for actors to engage politically in contestation and collaboration over system
governance and the distribution of benefits. The framework offers a multidimensional
and multi-level approach to understanding power relations, ideology, and value
appropriation in GPNs. The framework is valuable for examining the intersection of
GPNs with charged political and social issues such as sweatshops and incomes for coffee
growers, and the role of geography as a source of stability and tension in these networks.
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Political Contestation in Global Production Networks
When you drink a cup of coffee, you are completing the final link in a global chain of activities
that made that cup of coffee possible…. That simple act of sipping your coffee connects you to
peasant farmers in Colombia and Indonesia, to dockworkers in São Paulo and Mombassa, New
Orleans and San Francisco, and to many others in between (Talbot, 2004: 1).

Multinational corporations (MNCs) face increasing pressure to engage with social issues
related to their international operations. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, has been
forced to accept the manufacture of generic drugs for AIDS/HIV in developing countries (Sell &
Prakash, 2004; Vachani & Smith, 2004). Coffee processors and retailers have been challenged
over the low prices paid to growers in some Latin American countries (Blowfield, 2004; Kolk,
2005; Talbot, 2004). Manufacturers of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) face a host of
activist campaigns and are subject to an international agreement that regulates trade in these
products (Andrée, 2005). Branded clothing companies have confronted numerous allegations of
running ‘sweatshops’ in developing countries (Boje, 1998; Tulder & Kolk, 2001). These cases
exemplify the entanglement of global production networks (GPNs) with charged social and
political issues. GPNs are thus characterized by contestation as well as collaboration among
multiple actors, including firms, state and international agencies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and industry associations, each with their own interests and agendas.
GPNs are therefore not simply arenas for market competition or chains of value-adding
activities, but rather comprise complex political-economic systems in which markets, and their
associated distribution of resources and authority, are constructed within, as well as actively
shape, their socio-political context.
A useful starting point for analyzing GPNs can be drawn from Gereffi’s (1994: 2)
description of ‘Global Commodity Chains’ (GCCs) as “sets of interorganizational networks

clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one
another within the world-economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially
constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic
organization.” A number of scholars prefer the phrase ‘Global Production Networks’ (Dicken,
2003; Ernst & Ravenhill, 1999; Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002) because the
term ‘network’ implies multiple relational forms and directions and avoids the linear connotation
of ‘chains’, while ‘production’ is intended to convey not just economic activity but also “the
social processes involved in producing goods and services and reproducing knowledge, capital
and labour power” (Henderson et al., 2002: 444). It also avoids potential confusion in the use of
the term ‘commodity’, which is often used to refer to undifferentiated, low margin products.
GPNs entail the disaggregation and dispersion of economic activities to multiple
geographic locations. This dispersion in turn requires a high degree of coordination and
integration of supply chain activities, which often draws on the organizational capacity and
geographic reach of MNCs and entails substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) and
international trade (Caves, 1996; Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995). In many cases, such as
‘sweatshop’ allegations and high prices for AIDS drugs, it is precisely the linkages created by
GPNs across disparate regions with vastly different incomes, labor practices, and consumption
patterns that give rise to contentious social concerns. On account of their economic and political
character, GPNs are subject to complex forms of governance at multiple levels. Governance is
defined broadly here to mean the rules, institutions, and norms that channel and constrain
economic activity and its impacts. It therefore includes not only national level regulation and
formal international agreements, but also the coordination of supply chains and the promulgation
of private codes of conduct regarding labor or environmental standards (Cutler, Hauffler, and
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Porter, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Levy & Newell, 2005; Prakash & Hart,
1999).
This paper develops a critical framework on international management and production
that analyzes the intersection of geographically dispersed economic networks with controversial
social issues. Drawing from literatures on institutional theory and entrepreneurship, global
commodity chains and global production networks, and neo-Gramscian approaches to
international political economy, the paper proposes that GPNs are simultaneously economic and
political phenomena. The framework is illustrated using a range of empirical examples, but with
a focus on the coffee sector. The paper unfolds in the following manner. The remainder of the
introduction introduces key concepts and outlines the core argument. The paper then presents a
brief critique of conventional interpretations of international production, followed by an
elaboration of the three theoretical approaches employed here to develop an understanding of
GPNs as integrated economic-political systems. The articulation of these three theoretical
approaches provides a multi-level perspective that yields a number of insights into the
relationship between material and discursive dimensions of GPNs, the dynamic processes by
which they are constituted and challenged, and their interaction with wider structures of power.
A sociological perspective on markets suggests their embeddedness within wider social
and political institutions (Callon, 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2002), and
the construction of managerial roles and consumer identities within this larger system (Olds &
Thrift, 2005). The economic structures of GPNs, represented, for example, in the lack of market
power of developing country coffee growers or garment workers, tend to reflect broader
geopolitical, ethnic, and gender power structures. Yet the GPN framework developed in this
paper also pays attention to the agency of actors in mobilizing and deploying resources, forging
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alliances, shaping regulatory structures, and framing issues. From this perspective, GPNs
resemble contested organizational fields in which actors struggle over the construction of
economic relationships, governance structures, institutional rules and norms, and discursive
frames (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Rao, Morrill, Zald, 2000).
These efforts of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ to change fields are frequently met with resistance
from “field dominants”, defined by McAdam and Scott (2005: 17) as “those individuals, groups,
and organizations around whose actions and interests the field tends to revolve.”
The concept of a field derives from institutional theory’s attention to the behavior of
organizations within interrelated networks. According to Rao et al. (2000: 251), “Organizational
fields….consist of regulatory agencies, professional societies, consumers, suppliers, and
organizations that produce similar goods and services”, and these fields “exhibit distinctive
‘rules of the game’, relational networks, and resource distributions.” Institutional theory has
traditionally sought to explain convergence and stability in fields in terms of regulative,
cognitive, and normative isomorphic forces (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott & Meyer, 1994).
More recently, institutional theorists have emphasized the conflictual nature of contestation
among actors over field structures and processes (Fligstein, 1997; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Levy
& Rothenberg, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000). Hoffman’s (1999: 352) analysis of
competing environmental practices and discursive framings in the chemical industry highlights
how “field constituents are often armed with opposing perspectives rather than with common
rhetorics. The process may more resemble institutional war than isomorphic dialogue.”
While GPNs constitute social institutions, they also have an important material
dimension. Recent theoretical and empirical work on global commodity chains and production
networks is valuable in illuminating the inequalities that stem from asymmetric power relations
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across firms and regions, recasting value chains as systems of value appropriation as much as
creation (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Henderson et al., 2002). This stream of research is
valuable in highlighting a political dimension of market power, though it tends to take a rather
economistic approach to power relations in value chains, focusing on the construction and
protection of monopolistic advantages that generate high margins, or ‘economic rent’, while
neglecting wider institutions of power. The present framework addresses these shortcomings by
drawing from the growing literature that extends Gramscian theory to consider the nature of
power and ideology in structures of international governance (Cox, 1987; Gill, 1993; van der
Pijl, 1998). The neo-Gramscian approach is particularly useful for understanding the dialectical
manner in which GPNs are shaped by, yet constitutive of, the broader context of neoliberal
ideologies and institutions, geopolitical inter-state structures, and patriarchal gender relations.
The Gramscian concept of hegemony offers a rich theoretical perspective on the configuration of
economic, organizational, and discursive forces that stabilize and structure GPNs, and the nature
of consent within these systems. Moreover, a Gramscian understanding suggests the potential
and limitations of strategies for challenging and changing GPNs, and the intertwined political
and economic character of these challenges.
It is hardly novel, of course, to observe that the globalization of production entails an
international division of labor that reflects and reproduces class, gender, and ethnic inequalities
(Fernandez-Kelly, 1994; Frobel, Heinrichs, & Kreye, 1977). In developing countries in
particular, the repression of unions (Boje, 1998) intersects with patriarchy (Calás & Smircich,
1993) and geopolitical relations in the constitution of conducive nodes within GPNs (Enloe,
1989). Fuentes and Ehrenreich (1983) used the term ‘global factory’ to suggest the mobilization
and integration of these power asymmetries into capitalist production. The conceptual framework
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developed here is innovative in the way it synthesizes and extends concepts from the three
theoretical streams to understand the integrated economic, political, and discursive dimensions of
GPNs. The international dispersion of GPNs masks asymmetries of power and income to some
extent, but also creates opportunities for strategic agents to reveal these asymmetries, find points
of tension and leverage, and challenge their structures and processes. McAdam and Scott (2005:
17) describe challengers as “those individuals, groups and organizations seeking to challenge the
advantaged position of dominants or fundamental structural-procedural features of the field.”
These challenges generally entail economic, political, and discursive strategies, mirroring the
elements of structural stability. However, even when challenger groups achieve some significant
impact, such as the development of industry codes of conduct, the process of corporate
accommodation frequently reinforces the legitimacy, and hence the political and market
positioning of dominant firms. This dynamic process of contestation and accommodation casts
new light on corporate social responsibility debates.

Conventional Perspectives on International Production and Management
The political understanding of GPNs proposed in this paper contrasts with conventional
approaches to international production, which revolve around economistic considerations of
location-specific advantages, such as factor costs and market access, and firm-specific
advantages, such as technological or marketing expertise. These advantages are not static
endowments, but rather dynamic capacities that accumulate at the firm and regional cluster level
(Doeringer & Terkla, 1995; Porter, 1990; Shaver & Flyer, 2000). Within this framework, high
transaction costs for intangible and transaction-specific assets would lead multinational
corporations to internalize markets for them and directly control overseas operations (Buckley &
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Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988; Teece, 1986). MNCs are frequently conceived as overcoming
barriers to trade through their ability to coordinate flows of goods, money, information, and
people around the globe (Caves, 1996; Eden, 1991). MNCs can employ FDI as a substitute or as
a complement for domestic production and exports (Kotabe, 1992; Salomon & Shaver, 2005).
By the mid-1980s, production processes were increasingly being decomposed into
constituent activities and dispersed to disparate geographic locations. Porter’s (1985) conception
of the ‘value chain’ became widely adopted as a conceptual framework for considering the
linked set of economic activities that ‘add value’ at every stage, from research and development
to final assembly and marketing. The task for managers in this framework is to construct the
value chain so that activities are dispersed to appropriate locations in terms of proximity to
markets, production costs, and resource availability (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Kotabe & Swan,
1994; Swamidass & Kotabe, 1993). At the same time, value chains require coordination and
integration in order to take advantage of scale economies, learning opportunities, and the benefits
of integrated logistics and lean production (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Levy, 1997). The central
challenge of international business is seen as balancing the sometimes conflicting pressures for
local responsiveness and for global integration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz,
1987).
The increasing fragmentation of international production is driven by a series of
economic, technological, organizational, and political factors. The emerging digital
telecommunications infrastructure affords a dramatic increase in capacity and function at sharply
lower costs, reducing the transaction costs of coordinating dispersed operations and facilitating
trade in engineering, medical, legal, and other services. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, a broad liberalization trend has brought policies that favor foreign investment, exports, and
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unrestricted capital flows (Dunning, 1993; Henderson et al., 2002). Developing countries,
especially China and India, have created significant regional advantages based not just on lowcosts but also on technical expertise and growing firm-level capabilities (Friedman, 2005). Large
firms have also augmented their capacity for coordinating dispersed networks by developing new
organizational practices and more modular production processes that rely on standards and
routinized interfaces with suppliers and customers (Ernst, 2000; Ernst & Ravenhill, 1999). As
Buckley and Ghauri (2004: 83) put it:
The managers of MNEs are increasingly able to segment their activities and to seek the
optimal location for increasingly specialised slivers of activity. This ability to separate
and relocate stages of production has led to a boom in manufacturing in China and
service activities (e.g. call centres) in India. MNEs are also increasingly able to
coordinate these activities by means of a wide variety of mechanisms from wholly owned
FDI through licensing and subcontracting to market relationships. The more precise use
of location and ownership strategies by MNEs is the very essence of increasing
globalisation.
Conventional theories thus view the growth of international production and its specific
configuration to be a result of economic forces that promote efficiency and value creation. Firms
are viewed as efficiency-seeking agents, the organizational incarnations of more abstract
phenomena such as comparative advantage. If international production is increasingly taking
place within networks of subcontractors that are coordinated by dominant firms without direct
ownership ties, then this is viewed as a market response to the lower costs of inter-firm relative
to intra-firm coordination (Ernst, 2000). According to Henderson (2002: 444), “the GPN is seen
to supersede the transnational corporation as the most effective form of industrial organization.”
There is little doubt that economic forces play a central role in structuring GPNs, or that
the growth in various forms of international production has contributed to rising output and
incomes, at least in certain regions and particular sectors of the population. The problem is that
purely economic accounts offer an inadequate portrayal of the complex ways in which market

8

forces themselves operate within social and political contexts, as well as shape those contexts.
An undue emphasis on efficiency, at the expense of concerns with equity or power, is closely
tied to the broader ideology of free trade and a neoliberal discourse promoting the benefits of
privatization and globalization (Gill & Law, 1993).
Emblematic of this approach is a recent series of articles on offshore sourcing published
in the influential journal of McKinsey, the management consulting firm. Agrawal and Farrell
(2003: 37) argue in The McKinsey Quarterly that “companies move their business services
offshore because they can make more money—which means that wealth is created for the United
States as well as for the country receiving the jobs.” According to Agrawal and Farrell’s analysis
(2003: 41), “For every dollar of spending on business services that moves offshore, US
companies save 58 cents, mainly in wages” and these lower costs constitute “by far the greatest
source of value creation for the US economy.” In a critique of the McKinsey article, Levy (2005:
689) draws attention to the ideological assumptions embedded in the argument: “Wealth transfer
is equated with wealth creation, corporate interests are conflated with those of society as a
whole, and the process is portrayed as natural and inevitable, leading to prosperity for
industrialized and developing countries alike.” Reducing wages does not ‘create value’, even in
narrow economistic terms, though it certainly does transfer wealth from workers to shareholders.
This optimistic rendition of international production is far from uncontested. Indeed,
there has been a resurgence of popular discontent and academic debate concerning every facet of
globalization, from its impact on employment, inequality, and development (Korten, 1995;
Narula & Dunning, 2000) to its social and cultural significance (Bauman, 1998; Castells, 1997;
Lash & Urry, 1994). While some have argued that globalization increases the power of MNCs
and renders states increasingly powerless and irrelevant (Griffen, 2003; Ohmae, 1991; Strange,
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1996), others assert that while economic integration might undermine traditional notions of
sovereignty, it transforms the role of states and the nature and locus of governance (Braithwaite
& Drahos, 2000; Carnoy & Castells, 2001; Held & McGrew, 1993; Sassen, 1996). There have
been significant challenges to the very idea of globalization, with some claiming that MNCs still
retain a strongly national character and that the extent of global integration is neither
unprecedented nor irreversible (Berger & Dore, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Pauly & Reich,
1997). This perspective has led some to interpret globalization as a discursive construction that
promotes the importance of pursuing ‘competitiveness’ and serves to discipline firms, labor, and
governments (Cerny, 1997; Piven & Cloward, 1997; Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995: 169).
These debates, for the most part, have occurred amongst scholars of sociology, economic
geography, and international political economy. Within international business, the bargaining
theory of foreign direct investment proposes that the distribution of benefits between MNCs and
host countries is a function of the bargaining power of the parties (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Vernon,
1977). While this opens the door to a consideration of distributional impacts, the dominant view
is that power shifts in favor of host countries over time. Moreover, bargaining theory does not
address the presence of multiple actors in contested issue arenas. It has a narrow focus on
economic sources of power, and it assumes that states act in the general interest, neglecting class,
ethnic, and gender divisions, or potential alliances between the state and foreign capital (Evans,
1979; Gereffi, 1985; Levy & Prakesh, 2003; Ramamurti, 2001).
Controversial issues in international business have received considerable scrutiny from
the perspective of business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Working conditions
in subcontractors of famous brand-name shoe and apparel firms such as Nike or The Gap, many
of which are based in developing countries, provide one prominent example (Boje, 1998; Radin,
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2004; Tulder & Kolk, 2001). More recently, a growing literature on ‘ethical sourcing’ has drawn
attention to the low prices paid to coffee growers in relation to the premium prices charged by
stores such as Starbucks (Blowfield, 2004; Kolk, 2005). Ethics and CSR perspectives have
tended to view corporate practices, prices, and working conditions as matters of managerial
discretion rather than an outcome of production networks as economic, political, and ideological
systems.
The coffee case illustrates the economic, political, and ideological context in which GPNs
are embedded. Coffee growers in developing countries are paid an average of about 50 cents per
pound of coffee exported, though many growers only receive 20-30 cents (Kolk, 2005; Talbot,
2004). While a substantial amount of coffee is grown by smallholders or co-ops, large
plantations predominate in some regions with workers receiving a very small proportion of the
coffee price. Various intermediaries in coffee growing countries, including buyers, exporters,
and credit providers, take a significant slice of the value chain. By far the largest amount of
‘value added’ is realized in the major Western consumer markets, where coffee wholesales for
around $4 per pound and retailers such as Starbucks sell for about $10, with specialty and
organic coffees reaching $14 a pound. Brewed liquid coffee sells for the equivalent of $60-100
per pound. As Talbot (2004: 163) makes clear in his extensive study, the distribution of income
along the chain is a function of “struggles over the structure of the commodity chain and the
politics of its governance.” To understand the working conditions facing workers and
smallholders, we need to examine the market power of branded multinational coffee roasters and
retailers, the consumer culture that grants status to these brands, geopolitical relations between
the United States, Latin America, and other regions, the system of ethnic, class, and gender
relations in growing regions, the ideology of neoliberalism that underpins a faith in ‘free
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markets’, and the role of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank in promoting cash crop
coffee exports from heavily indebted developing countries. Markets are clearly highly political
constructs.1

Global Production Networks as Contested Fields
The political character of markets is the common denominator of the three theoretical lenses
brought to bear in this paper. First, I draw from institutional theory to posit that global
production networks, as a set of structured yet contested relations, resemble institutional fields.
This perspective offers a number of theoretical insights into their constitution and possibilities
for change. Fields are frequently conceived at the national level, though Scott (1994: 206) has
argued that: “Organizations are in the same field if they take one another into account, regardless
of the geographic propinquity. In this way, the field conception emphasizes the possible
importance of distant, non-local connections among organizations.” Nevertheless, national
institutional environments are quite distinct in their regulatory, cultural and normative aspects.
As a result, organizations that span national borders, such as MNCs and some NGOs, are subject
to divergent pressures at the level of national sub-units (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Westney, 1993).
Simultaneously, these organizations can be members of a common industry, creating convergent
pressures. Indeed, ‘issue arenas’ such as biotechnology and sweatshops can be considered as
fields with their own institutional infrastructure and norms at the international level (Levy &
Kolk, 2002).
GPNs comprise diverse types of organizations, often in quite different industries. For
example, a coffee production network encompasses coffee growers in developing countries,
multinational food processors, traders active in futures and options markets, and large-scale
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retailers. These corporate forms interact with other actors who are not directly part of the
production chain, such as NGOs, government agencies, and international organizations. Indeed,
actors might barely recognize their membership in a common network. Awareness of their
identity within a common system grows as actors collaborate and compete over economic,
regulatory, and ideological dimensions of the network. Hardy and Phillips (1998: 218) contend
that fields “emerge as different organizations perceive themselves to be connected to common
issues. They are not objective, predetermined structures, but processes of social construction and
meaning creation, wherein social order is negotiated.” For example, NGOs have collaborated
with coffee growers, processors, and retailers in establishing Fair Trade programs in which
growers are paid higher rates for certified coffee that is marketed under the Fair Trade label to
Western consumers for premium prices (Kolk, 2005). The Fair Trade campaign by NGOs such
as Global Exchange and the Rainforest Alliance has stimulated awareness that coffee farmers
and retailers are members of a system possessing important social and political dimensions. The
campaign thus played a role in constructing and politicizing the GPN as a field in which
corporate practices are linked economically and discursively to poor working conditions for
growers in developing countries. This challenge to existing market relations has been countered
by the coffee industry, which argues that the problem is oversupply on world markets rather than
income distribution within the chain. This claim is framed within the broader ideology of free
trade to suggest that any interference in the market will only exacerbate matters (Blowfield,
2004; Talbot, 2004).
Challenging existing field structures and practices, and attempting to construct new
institutional forms is a political project led by institutional entrepreneurs (Fligstein, 1997; Hardy,
Phillips, and Lawrence, 2003; Maguire et al., 2004). Social movement theory has been influential
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in suggesting the forms of agency, sources of power, and strategic repertoire available to them
(Fligstein, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). As Rao et al. (2000: 240) put it:
We conceptualize the construction of new organizational forms as a political process in
which social movements play a double-edged role: They de-institutionalize existing
beliefs, norms, and values embodied in extant forms, and establish new forms that
instantiate new beliefs, norms and values. Crucial in these processes are institutional
entrepreneurs who lead efforts to identify political opportunities, frame issues and
problems, and mobilize constituencies.
Hardy and Philips (1998: 219) point to three aspects of power that are important in these
processes: formal authority, the control of critical resources, and discursive legitimacy.
Organization theorists, however, have tended to emphasize the social construction of fields and
hence the importance of political contestation in the cognitive and normative realms (Maguire &
Hardy, 2006; Selsky, Spicer, Teicher, 2003). Research has therefore tended to focus on the
efforts to advance competing frames in efforts to secure legitimacy and build coalitions
(Hensmans, 2003; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003). The emphasis on discourse and
framing strategies has tended to obscure other dimensions in which fields are ordered. In
particular, GPNs are structured in the economic and technological realms, and are subject to
governance structures capable of exerting regulatory and coercive authority. In the following
section, the evolution of the concept of global production networks is elaborated, in order to
examine more closely the nature of order and power within these specific types of fields.

From Value Chains to Global Production Networks
Stephen Hymer’s groundbreaking theoretical work on foreign investment and MNCs is now
recognized by international business scholars as an essential starting point for investigating the
relationship between market and political power (Buckley, 2006; Pitelis, 2006). Hymer (1972,
1976) posited that MNCs possess unique firm-specific advantages that afford significant market
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power in oligopolistic industries through control of key technologies, brands, and distribution
networks. Hymer was the first to recognize that MNCs are created when firms internalize
markets for these advantages across national borders (Pitelis, 2006), and he shifted the frame of
analysis for international production from finance to questions of control (Strange & Newton,
2006).
Hymer (1979) later developed these insights into a radical political-economic perspective
in which MNCs “would transplant their vertical power structures to the globe, creating a vertical
division of power between ‘superior and inferior’ states, cities and indeed peoples” (Pitelis,
2006: 104). Hymer’s analysis of MNCs within oligopolistic markets paralleled the development
of critical macro-perspectives on trade and investment, particularly the dependency school
(Amin, 1976; Evans, 1979) and world systems theory (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995;
Wallerstein, 2004), which viewed relations between industrial and developing countries as
fundamentally exploitative and conditioned on unequal terms of trade. Indeed, Hymer’s work
constitutes the micro-foundations of these unequal relations. Frobel et al. (1977) described the
ensuing international inequalities in power and income as ‘The New International Division of
Labor’. Feminist scholars drew attention to the way in which international capital was
reorganizing along gendered as well as ethnic lines (Calás & Smircich, 1993; Chang, 2000;
Fuentes & Ehrenreich, 1983), while more recent neo-colonialist analyses (Banerjee & Linstead,
2001) argue that these asymmetric relationships are embedded in ideological systems that
devalue non-western norms and knowledge.
Hymer’s key insight was that market power is thoroughly imbricated with political
power, at the sectoral and even firm level. The market power associated with firm-specific assets
such as technology or market access bears some affinity to the concept of resource dependency
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as a source of power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Hymer’s treatment, however, relates the market
power of particular firms to more structural features of a stratified global political economy in
which Western states and firms occupy a privileged position. In this vein, Gereffi (1985) and
Evans (1979) described how MNCs enhance their power through their market and technology
strategies and their alliances with local political elites. Gereffi’s contribution, which was framed
as a rejoinder to the ‘obsolescing bargain’ approach to MNC–host country relations (Kobrin,
1987; Vernon, 1971), served as a critical bridge to the development of Gereffi’s more recent
work on Global Commodity Chains.
Hymer has been widely criticized for emphasizing power over efficiency-based
explanations of MNCs (Teece, 2006). These critiques, however, elide the extent to which market
power is intertwined with efficiency, so that value creation is inextricably entangled with value
capture. Pitelis (2006: 107) points out that Penrose (1959) had earlier observed that firm-specific
‘efficiency’ advantages derived from innovation can constitute the basis for monopolistic power.
A common denominator of contemporary strategy theory, from Porter’s (1985) ‘5-forces’
analysis of market structures to the resource based view (Barney, 1991) and recent writing on
dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), is that firms only derive above-normal
profits from advantages that are sheltered from imitation. Walmart, for example, has firmspecific efficiency advantages that it has leveraged into substantial market power over
competitors and suppliers, but this power takes on more explicitly political dimensions when
wielded over labor and government agencies (Lichtenstein, 2006).
Conventional analyses of market power do not treat the topic as inherently political.
States do, of course, provide legal sanction for the protection of patents, copyrights, and other
forms of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and MNCs have increasingly sought to extend and
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protect these IPRs through multilateral organizations such as the WTO (Sell & Prakash, 2004).
Mintzberg builds on the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) to argue that firms are deeply
involved in negotiating their external environments in order to build and protect market position,
such that any distinction between the economic and the political “must be considered artificial”
(Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998: 235). This confluence of economic and political power
is illustrated in Hirsch’s (1975) classic study of the pharmaceutical industry, in which he argued
that its superior profitability derived from effective management of the institutional environment,
particularly product entry, pricing, patent protection, and media coverage. The development of
instant coffee illuminates the political nature of market positioning and the difficulty in
demarcating value creation from value capture. Instant coffee, initially developed by Swiss MNC
Nestlé, is much more capital and technology intensive than regular coffee, creating barriers to
entry for smaller companies from developing countries (Talbot, 2004: 35). When Brazilian
companies attempted to enter the instant coffee market to increase their own ‘value added’ and
export it in bulk to western coffee MNCs, the latter objected, despite attractive prices. The coffee
majors understood that this was a struggle for power and control over the industry (2004: 140).
Global Commodity Chain analysis develops Hymer’s earlier insights to examine the
distribution of ‘value added’ and rent in a chain by analyzing the interaction of geographic and
firm-specific advantages, the locational configuration of activities, the institutional context, and
the governance structures that regulate and integrate dispersed operations (Bair, 2005; Gereffi &
Korzeniewicz, 1994; Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977). GCC analysis has provided a series of rich
case studies of the dynamics by which firms build positions of market power and defend them in
the face of relentless competitive pressures to commoditize products and services (Bair &
Gereffi, 2003). These studies, located in the context of the spatial and political structure of
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production activities, often highlight the constraints as well as opportunities facing developing
countries as they engage with globalization processes (Kaplinsky, 2000).
GCC analysis has brought attention to the relationship between market power and
network-level governance. Gereffi (1994) distinguishes between producer-driven chains, such as
the automobile industry, in which manufacturers dominate network coordination and capture the
lion’s share of value, and buyer-driven chains, such as the clothing sector, in which companies
derive substantial profits from strong brand names and distribution while orchestrating networks
of low-margin subcontractors. Kaplinsky (2000) discusses three forms of chain governance,
legislative (rule setting), judicial (rule enforcement) and executive (corporate management).
These governance functions relate to logistics, technical standards, quality, and design.
The emphasis on networks rather than chains among those who prefer GPN terminology
highlights the “intricate links – horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical – forming multidimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activity” (Henderson et al., 2002: 442). Ernst’s
rendition of GPNs emphasizes modes of governance that facilitate technical coordination of
spatially dispersed activity and facilitate the flow of tacit knowledge (Ernst, 2000; Ernst &
Ravenhill, 1999). For economic geographers, the GPN framework examines the dynamic
linkages and institutionalized power relations that these networks create not just across economic
space, but also across social and institutional contexts, at national, regional, and sub-national
levels (Dicken, Kelly, Olds, & Yeung, 2001). Overall, GPN methodology attempts to
characterize:
the networks of firms involved in R&D, design, production and marketing of a given
product, and how these are organized globally and regionally; the distribution of
corporate power within those networks, and changes therein; the significance of labour
and the processes of value creation and transfer; the institutions – particularly
government agencies, but also in some cases trade unions, employer associations and
NGOs – that influence firm strategy in the particular locations absorbed into the
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production chain; and the implications of all of these for technological upgrading, valueadding and capturing, economic prosperity etc. (Henderson et al., 2002: 447).
Despite these lofty ambitions, most of the studies spawned by the GPN framework to
date are, in practice, very similar to those generated using GCC analysis. Much of the discussion
concerns market power and consequent rents due to firm-level expertise and skills in
coordinating complex networks. Indeed, the GCC and GPN literatures display an increasingly
developmental tone, discussing how firms in developing countries might ‘upgrade’ their
capabilities and thus create and capture more ‘value’ locally (Kaplinsky, 2005). The GCC/GPN
framework appears to be converging with more conventional approaches to competitiveness and
losing touch with its more critical origins (Bair, 2005). The discussion of governance emphasizes
economic coordination rather than political contestation or the broader institutions and discursive
structures in which markets are embedded. Moreover, the ideologies that constitute and
legitimate particular forms of governance, production and income distribution receive little
attention. The neo-Gramscian approach to international relations provides a valuable theoretical
framework for locating GPNs in this wider context, as well as for understanding the relationship
between material and discursive dimensions of order and power within these fields.

A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Global Production Networks
Interest in Gramsci’s writing2 has enjoyed a modest revival in recent years in the field of
international political economy (Gill, 1993; Jessop, 2005; Murphy, 1998; van der Pijl, 1998) and,
to a lesser degree, in the literature on social movements, organizational resistance, and global
managerial networks (Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001; Carroll & Carson, 2003; Mumby,
1997; Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Here the term ‘neo-Gramscian’ is used to acknowledge that the
conceptual framework presented here extends Gramsci’s ideas beyond national class conflict to
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examine conflictual social issues in international arenas engaging business and other societal
actors. A neo-Gramscian approach offers an integrative perspective on GPNs that takes account
of both their economic structure and their institutional character as an amalgam of rules, norms,
and taken-for-granted ideas and practices. The notion of hegemonic stability in GPNs illuminates
the process by which actors grant consent, at least contingently, to a set of arrangements in which
authority and rewards are distributed asymmetrically; the contingency of hegemony points to the
potential for strategic agents to challenge GPNs and highlights the political character of ensuing
contestation.
Gramsci conceived of society as a complex dynamic system of structures and forces
operating at multiple levels. He used the term hegemony to refer to a condition of relative
stability in this system, in which a dominant alliance, or ‘historical bloc’, would emerge. This
historical bloc sustains its position through the coercive authority of the state, dominance in the
economic realm, and the consensual legitimacy of civil society. A key Gramscian insight is that
hegemony in capitalist democracies relies primarily on consensual processes that accommodate
subordinate groups to some degree, through a measure of political and material compromise and
by the dissemination of ideologies that convey a mutuality of interests. Hegemony thus entails:
not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral
unity…the development and expansion of the [dominant] group are conceived of, and
presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion…In other words, the
dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate
groups (Gramsci, 1971: 181).
The globalization of economic and political processes in recent decades has led a number
of observers to posit the emergence of a “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair, 1998), composed
of senior managers, professionals, academics, and state officials linked in a loose alliance and
sharing a common ideology. Gill (1995: 400) uses the Gramscian term “transnational historical
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bloc” to describe this formation “with its nucleus largely comprising elements of the G-7 state
apparatuses and transnational capital…and associated privileged workers and smaller firms.” An
historical bloc possesses two closely related dimensions; first, it refers to the organizational
structure of the system, comprising alliances and hierarchical relations among various actors;
second, it relates to the specific alignment of material, organizational, and discursive formations
that stabilize and reproduce relations of production, meaning, and power. An historical bloc is
‘hegemonic’ when the synchronization of its various elements achieves a degree of stability and
consent grounded in the construction of common interests. It should be emphasized that this
multilayered concept of hegemony is quite different from the traditional use of the term in
international relations to refer to the power of dominant states (Keohane, 1984).
Some striking parallels are evident between the concept of hegemony and the isomorphic
stability of institutional theory (Scott & Meyer, 1994). Both view social order as contingent on a
balance of the coercive pressure of rules and more consensual forces of norms, cognitive frames,
and taken-for-granted ideas. Moreover, the process of constructing (or challenging) hegemony
corresponds closely to the “political model of action in the organizational field” (Fligstein, 1997:
398) in organizational theory (see also Rao et al., 2000; Seo & Creed, 2002). Fligstein points to
the importance of actors maintaining an image of selflessness as they frame issues in ways that
resonate with existing conceptions of interest in order to build wider coalitions. Similarly,
Maguire et al. (2004: 658) argue that the key to success in constructing and changing fields “is
the way in which institutional entrepreneurs connect their change projects to the activities and
interests of other actors in a field, crafting their project to fit the conditions of the field itself.”
The concept of hegemony enriches our understanding of institutional fields in several ways,
however. First, the notion of hegemony as an interwoven material and discursive formation
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provides a healthy antidote to the tendency in institutional theory to neglect the role of the
economic and technological realm. Second, it provides a more dynamic view of social reality as
“a relation of forces in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium” (Gramsci, 1971: 172). Third,
it emphasizes the political nature of the struggles to shape the economic, discursive, and
organizational dimensions of a field.
Importantly, Gramsci's concept of hegemony illuminates why weaker groups might
consent to participate in a GPN in which they have little influence over the ‘rules of the game’
and do not enjoy a ‘fair share’ of the benefits. Hegemony conveys a subtle balance of ideology
that legitimates the outcomes of a system, substantive concessions to weaker groups, and a
degree of economic and political coercion. Consent, then, does not mean that weaker groups are
dupes suffering from a form of ‘false consciousness’, as has been alleged by some critics of the
dominant ideology thesis (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1980). Gramsci’s concept of ideology is
not a rigid system of ideas imposed on people in conflict with a set of pre-constituted, objective
interests; rather, ideology is a relatively coherent articulation of meaning, embodied in
institutions, language, and practices, that constructs people’s identities and interests, aligning
them to some degree with the broader polity (Hall, 1986: 20; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 67). Yet
ideology is also partial and fragmented (Gramsci, 1971: 327; Mumby, 1997: 344), creating space
for resistance. Consent thus rests on strategic acquiescence as much as ideological domination
(Levy & Egan, 2003; Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1982).
Though much of Gramsci’s analysis was situated at the national level (Germain &
Kenny, 1998), his writing indicates an appreciation that regional and national fields comprise
subsystems within broader international governance structures with economic and ideological
elements: “international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states,
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creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance,
born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on
the local interplay of combinations” (Gramsci 1971: 182). He also noted the emergence of
“international public and private organizations that might be the shapeless and chaotic civil
society of a larger, economically concrete social order, and that certainly promoted such an order
— the League of Nation’s economic agencies, the International Chamber of Commerce, the
World Council of Churches, the ILO, and various international fraternal orders ” (Murphy, 1998:
423).
Locating GPNs in the context of transnational hegemonic structures provides more
insight into their constitution and struggles over their operation. Sklair (1997) argues that
transnational industry groupings such as the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue play a strategic
role in forging the infrastructure of an emerging transnational bloc.3 Cox (1987) describes the
growth and coordination at a global level of economic structures, neoliberal and consumerist
ideologies, and political institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which promulgate
rules and align interests. At the center of this bloc, Cox argues, is a transnational managerial
class, which, despite internal rivalries, displays an ‘awareness of a common concern to maintain
the system’ (1987: 359):
Various institutions have performed the function of articulating strategies in this common
concern: the Trilateral Commission, the OECD, the IMF, and the World Bank all serve as
foci for generating the policy consensus for the maintenance and defense of the
system…Prestigious business schools and international management training programs
socialize new entrants to the values, lifestyles, language (in the sense of shared concepts,
usages, and symbols), and business practices of the class.
Recent empirical work using network analysis (Carroll & Carson, 2003: 47) found that
“amid the persistence of national corporate power structures, the global policy groups fulfill an
integrative function, bringing together corporate directors and capitalist interests from various
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quarters of the world-system’s centre.” The dominant ideology of this transnational elite
embodies a “neoliberal discourse of governance that stresses the efficiency, welfare, and freedom
of the market, and self-actualisation through the process of consumption” (Gill, 1995: 401). This
ideology is buttressed by panoptic surveillance mechanisms that impose financial discipline on
states, companies, and individuals, from the monitoring of inflation rates and budget deficits to
corporate and personal credit ratings (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000). Gill terms the integration of
the structural power of capital with market and consumerist ideology “disciplinary neoliberalism”, which generates powerful pressures to intensify the commodification of labor,
nature, and other aspects of life: “A remarkable feature of contemporary world society is how
more and more aspects of everyday life in OECD nations have come to be premised upon or
pervaded by market values, representations, technological innovation, the hyper-mobility of
financial capital, and some types of information flows” (Gill, 1995: 409).
GPNs thus exist within the ‘transnational space’ that is constituted and structured by
transnational elites, institutions, and ideologies (Faist, 2000; Morgan, 2001). Within this space,
transnational communities emerge with economic systems, relations of power and institutional
forms that are distinct from, though interact with, national or region-bound forms (Urry, 2000).
For Morgan (2001: 118) these communities comprise transnational corporations, regulatory
agencies, and cognitive and normative frameworks which “have to be conceptualized in terms of
the interplay between top-down projects of transnationalism, pursued by powerful actors, and
bottom-up processes of mutual identification and collective awareness.” Morgan (2001: 125)
points to the crucial role of the business press and business schools in creating a sense of
common identity and interests, a shared understanding of business practices, and providing
points of access to transnational networks. Olds and Thrift (2005) use the term “cultural circuit
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of capital” to refer to the flows of knowledge, ideas, and values that bind together “global
assemblages” of actors and economic practices. They note the “the role of business schools as
the key nodes in this circuit” (2005: 272), alongside management consultancies and gurus, and
they also point to the role of the media as “key means of transport, amplifiers, and generators of
business knowledge” (2005: 274). Olds and Thrift argue that states are also mobilized within this
cultural circuit of capital to assume the mantle of securing economic growth and national
competitiveness, to which end they endeavor to produce “pliant but enterprising subjects” (2005:
275) with appropriate sets of skills and attitudes to succeed in highly competitive global labor
markets. Policymakers and professionals at the state and regional level are thus accomplices in
the rise of the ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 1997; Palan & Abbott, 1996), whose primary goal is to
improve ‘competitiveness’ and attract mobile investment (Stopford & Strange, 1991).
The neo-Gramscian perspective on GPNs highlights dynamic struggles over governance
and the relationship between technical features of the market with the wider political
environment. Shifting regimes of GPN governance in the coffee case illustrate these processes.
The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in force from 1962 till 1972 established a regulated
quota system in which growers received modestly higher, if more stable, prices. U.S. support for
the agreement during these Cold War years has generally been attributed to the desire to create
sufficient economic stability in Latin America to prevent the spread of Communism; indeed, the
ICA was viewed as a disguised form of international aid. The American National Coffee
Association, representing the large national coffee companies, shared these concerns and was
willing to pay modestly higher prices for more secure and stable supply (Talbot, 2004: 58-60).
The ICA lapsed in 1972, was renegotiated for a period, but finally collapsed in 1989, leading to a
dramatic fall in coffee prices. One reason for this shift in governance structure was the growing
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market power of Western multinational coffee producers and retailers, due to consolidation and
the growing importance of branded quality coffee. The position of growers was further weakened
by significant additions to global supply, as a number of developing countries attempted to
increase their cash crop exports, sometimes under the discipline of World Bank Structural
Adjustment Programs. By the late 1990s, Vietnam had become the world's second largest coffee
producer, surpassing Colombia. Under the these conditions, Western coffee MNCs could extend
their control over the supply chain and gain access to plentiful supplies of cheap coffee without a
restrictive international agreement.
Though the market-based coffee GPN of the 1990s conformed to the dominant neoliberal
ideology, low prices and the dire poverty of growers created new tensions that NGOs were able
to exploit, taking advantage of renewed popular concern with aspects of globalization. The
development of Fair Trade practices and industry codes of conduct, such as the Common Code
for the Coffee Community (4C), can be interpreted as a political effort to protect the hegemonic
stability of the GPN from threats to its legitimacy. Industry development and implementation of
these practices has transformed some NGOs from challengers to partners, widening the
hegemonic coalition. Couched within the discourse of corporate social responsibility, which
gained considerable discursive currency in the 1990s, the coffee industry’s accommodation to
pressure enables it to project moral and intellectual leadership and a sense of congruence
between corporate goals and the general interest. This is, of course, the essence of hegemony.

An Integrated Analytical Framework on Global Production Networks
A synthesis of the three theoretical perspectives discussed above yields a framework that views
GPNs as integrated economic, political, and discursive structures with a degree of structural

26

stability, but subject to challenge by strategic actors. The following section draws out two
significant implications, first, for the role of economic structures and processes in stabilizing
fields and reproducing particular discursive forms, and second, for the potential for challengers
to develop strategies to contest GPNs.
While scholarship on institutional theory and politically contested fields has paid
considerable attention to the embeddedness of markets and technologies in social and discursive
structures, it has neglected the role of the material realm in structuring the social. GCC/GPN
analysis has brought attention to the importance of market power in the distribution of rent and
governance, but has neglected discursive dimensions and wider structures of power. For Gramsci
(1971: 161), “though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily
be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the nucleus of economic
activity.” Neo-Gramscian writers in international political economy have described how a
globalizing economic system is accompanied by a legitimating set of neoliberal ideologies.
These ideas and norms concerning the benefits of free trade, ‘flexible’ labor, and a fiscally
restrained state, do not arise spontaneously in a deterministic relation to society’s material ‘base’,
but rather are developed and disseminated by dominant groups through policy, media, and
educational channels, sometimes against considerable opposition (McChesney, 2000).
Most telling, perhaps, is when a change in material conditions triggers a shift in
ideology. By the latter 1990s, there was increasing media concern about the economic impact of
offshore sourcing of high ‘value added’ products and services and associated skilled employment
(Kletzer, 2001; Levy, 2005). Free trade ideology had been firmly entrenched among policy and
professional elites since the rise of the United Kingdom as a global economic power in the mid
19th century, leading most economists and the financial press to respond with assurances that
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comparative advantage theory still applied, so that offshoring presents another opportunity for
Americans to upgrade their skills even further (Swann, 2004). In 2004, however, the economist
and Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson (2004) published a paper demonstrating that the United
States would be hurt by trade with India and China if those countries improved their export
performance in sectors traditionally dominated by the United States, such as software and aircraft
manufacturing. The paper does not rely on any sophisticated new analysis and revisits ideas
originally proposed in the 1970s; its appearance perhaps signals the opening of a fissure in the
hegemonic free trade system.
Here we posit that material structures play an important role in stabilizing fields at the
level of GPNs, by reproducing particular ideologies and by generating the economic incentives
required to induce cooperation from a diverse set of actors. ‘Business models’ need to generate
profits for firms, wages for labor, and result in sufficient demand from consumers. Of course,
these business models are also shaped by the political economy of the network, through property
rights and labor law, trade and tax policy, and subsidies, and companies frequently exert their
economic power to influence these factors. The continued dominance of the fossil fuel industry,
for example, is related not just to the low cost of these fuels, but to the power of the industry in
securing large subsidies and lax environmental regulation (Goodell, 2006). Efforts to promote
cleaner forms of energy and transportation have gained a degree of discursive legitimacy and are
supported by a wide coalition of NGOs, government agencies, and even some companies in the
‘clean energy’ sector. Nevertheless, these firms face substantial market barriers to entry and lack
political access and influence. Moreover, the new technologies such as solar panels and fuel cells
have not yet reached competitive cost and reliability levels; they are failing to ‘cooperate’, in the
language of actor-network theory (Callon, 1987).
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In contested GPNs, industry often uses economic resources to pursue discursive strategies
alongside other forms of political activity, thus building legitimating ideologies and governance
structures to support particular economic arrangements. Awareness of commercial opportunities
in biotechnology, for example, led entrepreneurial companies such as Monsanto to pursue public
relations strategies to frame genetically modified (GM) seeds and foods as a benign extension of
traditional methods of hybrid development that promise to improve yields and end hunger.
Simultaneously, these companies worked in the political and legal sphere to secure property
rights protection for GM products and to exempt them from the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration approval process (Andrée, 2005). Similarly, companies in fossil-fuel related
sectors facing the climate change issue have expended considerable resources to lobby against
mandatory emission controls at the international level, while casting doubt on the science of
climate change and emphasizing the high costs of action (Levy & Egan, 2003).
Industry strategies frequently extend beyond a particular GPN to shape broader global
institutional structures. Key service sectors were prominent architects of the agreement to extend
the global trade regime to include services during the Uruguay round of the GATT (the precursor
to the WTO) (Wesselius, 2002). Sell (2002) has amply documented the leading role of MNCs in
the software, entertainment, and pharmaceutical industries in promoting the discourse of
intellectual property rights and in actually drafting accords for Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.
Hegemonic fields are subject to continuous stress due to the dynamics of evolving
technologies, markets and ideologies. The dominance of neoliberalism, for example, does not
remain unchallenged; transnational institutions such as the World Bank and WTO have to
accommodate financial crises in Asia associated with deregulation of capital, the failures of
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water privatization in Latin America, and challenges from civil society to environmentally
damaging infrastructure projects (Williams & Ford, 1999). A neo-Gramscian perspective on
contested GPNs highlights the multiple dimensions of hegemonic structures and the potential for
subordinate groups to develop coordinated strategies that take advantage of tensions and points
of leverage in a complex socio-economic system. Indeed, a crucial element of Gramsci’s break
from the economic determinism associated with Marx was his elucidation of the “Modern
Prince”, the embodiment of collective strategic action by those with scarce access to material
resources or formal authority. Gramsci used the term ‘war of position’ to describe a long-term
strategy coordinated across multiple bases of power to gain legitimacy, shift economic relations,
develop organizational capacity, and win new allies; social movements trying to change practices
and structures in GPNs can be considered to be contemporary expressions of the Modern Prince,
using clever strategy to outmaneuver structural forms of power (Barker et al., 2001; Levy,
Willmott, and Alvesson, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, 2004). This insight is echoed in the institutional
entrepreneurship literature, which suggests that subordinate actors need to rely more heavily on
skills than material resources (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000).
The effective deployment of strategic power requires a detailed analysis of GPN
structures and processes. A GPN framework suggests that consumption of high-priced coffee and
clothing brands and production by low-wage labor are intrinsically linked and mutually
contingent. They are enabled by the intricate logistics of international production, yet they are
also sustained by the economic, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and legal distanciation involved. As
Henderson (2002: 446) suggests, GPNs “constitute and are re-constituted by the economic, social
and political arrangements of the places they inhabit.” The balance of coercion and consent
varies across countries, leaning more toward coercion in authoritarian countries, thus requiring
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fewer concessions to labor and less elaborate forms of workplace control. The political
sustainability of GPNs therefore depends, in part, on the insulating effect of distance between
conditions of production and consumption. As Klein observes (2000: 347), “[i]t’s as if the global
production chain is based on the belief that workers in the South and consumers in the North
will never figure out a way to communicate with each other.”
Activists have used these insights in their attempts to build discursive and organizational
connections across the barriers of distance to highlight the contradictions within GPNs. Multinational
corporations operating across national boundaries are particularly vulnerable because they provide
“opportunities for interest groups to identify practices used by the firm in some country that may be
unacceptable in another country and to use those as a rallying point” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 74).
NGOs engaged in a campaign against GM foods have explicitly used an understanding of the supply
chain structure to target vulnerable food retailer chains in Europe, several of whom adopted GM-free
policies (Schurman, 2004). In the clothing sector, student activists and labor groups developed
alliances with religious organizations and targeted companies whose well-known brands make them
particularly exposed to embarrassing disclosures. Activists have also successfully exerted pressure on
U.S. universities with large sportswear contracts, leveraging public visibility and concentrated
purchasing power (van Tulder & Kolk, 2003). NGOs found accounting firms to be unlikely allies
interested in developing the business of auditing social reports and compliance with codes of conduct.
Hegemonic systems are resilient to challenge, however, and tend to absorb and deflect
threats in ways that protect system fundamentals. Indeed, the long-term nature of a ‘war of
position’ makes it difficult to evaluate the success of challenger strategies at a given point in
time. Although some look optimistically to NGOs as a democratic force for change, representing
the interests of labor, women, and the environment (Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004), a
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Gramscian analysis suggests that civil society represents not only an arena of ideological
struggle, but also a key element of the ‘extended state’ in which hegemony is secured.
NGOs active in the coffee case have clearly made some significant gains; they have
created an awareness of coffee as a political and social issue, pressured many of the coffee
MNCs to adopt the ‘4C’ code of conduct, and they have helped to develop a market for Fair
Trade and organic coffee that substantially raises incomes for at least some growers and
eliminates some of the middlemen in the value chain. Yet these gains have not changed the core
asymmetries of power and income in the coffee GPN, and have perhaps even strengthened the
position of Western MNCs. The 4C code of conduct addresses the worst forms of corporate
practice, such as the use of bonded and forced labor, peasant eviction, access to potable water for
workers, and the use of banned pesticides (Kolk, 2005). It does not, however, touch structural
features of the GPN that influence income distribution. Fair Trade and organic coffee do not
comprise more than 1% of the global market (Talbot, 2004), offering just a few niche market
opportunities for growers and highlighting the limitations of strategies that rely on sociallymotivated purchasing decisions by affluent Western consumers (Utting, 2002). Meanwhile,
participation in these programs rewards coffee MNCs with stronger brand images and greater
legitimacy; Starbucks, for example, benefits from the publicity it received when it announced in
2001 a commitment to buy one million pounds of Fair Trade coffee over the following eighteen
months, though this is less than 2% of its total coffee purchases. Growers excluded from the
premium coffee segment find their position with commodity coffee is weaker than ever.
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Conclusions and Implications
This paper has developed a critical reconceptualization of international production by linking the
analysis of global production networks with the literatures on institutional entrepreneurship and
neo-Gramscian theory in international political economy. The result is a framework that provides
insights into the nature of power and hegemony in a global production network, encompassing
the dynamics of contestation and stability as actors employ economic, discursive, and
organizational strategies. The framework is particularly valuable in perceiving GPNs as, at once,
technically and organizationally sophisticated production networks, and as political systems
encompassing multiple dimensions of power. While more conventional treatments drawing from
commodity chain analysis focus on relations of market power among firms, here we consider
GPNs in the context of wider institutional, political, and discursive structures, as well as linkages
with NGOs and other actors usually considered to be external to GPNs.
The institutional entrepreneurship literature is valuable in furthering our understanding of
GPNs as contested fields in which actors develop a consciousness of their identities and interests,
and forge strategies to mobilize resources, build alliances, and frame issues in particular ways.
The neo-Gramscian approach adds to this conception in several ways. It offers an appreciation of
the multi-level dynamic interactions between GPNs and broader, more entrenched hegemonic
formations in the global political economy. It also offers theoretical linkages between the
configuration of material, ideological, and organizational forces comprising hegemonic stability
and contingency, and the strategies actors pursue to protect or challenge field formations. In
particular, it suggests how actors who are relatively disadvantaged in terms of material resources
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or formal authority can utilize smart strategy that takes advantage of fragile alliances or tensions
within and between the economic and discursive spheres.
At the same time, the multi-level and resilient nature of hegemony points to the
limitations of strategic action for change. Dominant actors frequently respond to pressure from
challengers with counter-strategies that entail a degree of local accommodation and compromise
around a specific issue, but in a way that preserves the essentials of a field structure, and in some
cases even reinforces their position. The ongoing and dynamic evolution of these fields suggests
that it is difficult, at least in the short run, to distinguish between reformist strategies that lead to
cooptation of challengers and the blunting of efforts for more systemic change, and long-term
dynamic strategies that use the shifting terrain of compromise as the staging ground for another
round of contestation.
The concept of hegemony as contingent stability in an evolving, contested field, helps
illuminate the coexistence of apparently contradictory trends in the global economy. On the one
hand, companies are undertaking a plethora of initiatives under the mantle of corporate social
responsibility, from annual social reports to the promulgation of codes of conduct. On the other
hand, inequality is rising in many Western countries as workers suffer from weakened unions,
loss of state provision of services, and increased competition from offshore sourcing and laborsaving technologies. Neoliberal institutions and ideologies appear to remain well entrenched;
indeed, the strengthening and extension of intellectual property rights in relation to software,
biotechnology, entertainment, and pharmaceuticals suggests a strengthening of the market power
of MNCs in these sectors and a deepening process of commodification. These contradictory
trends can be understood as manifestations of a shifting balance of forces as actors engage in
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strategies and counter-strategies at multiple levels across a complex economic and discursive
terrain.
While GCC/GPN analysis is centrally concerned with the relationship between high
profit margins and market power, it has not developed a more fundamental critique of the terms
‘value-added’ and ‘value chain’ and their ideological connotations. Indeed, these terms confer
discursive legitimacy by emphasizing collaboration in the generation of wealth rather than
conflicts over its distribution. The framework developed here renders problematic the entire
conception of ‘value-added’, and suggests that relations of power are associated with inequalities
in value appropriation. The managerial imperative to create and capture ‘value’ is inextricably
linked to the rise since the 1980s of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of corporate governance that
emphasizes ‘financialization’ of corporate objectives to meet capital market expectations and
appease mutual fund managers (Williams, 2000). The primacy of shareholder value and the
subjugation of production to financial market discipline is not necessarily congruent with
sustainable economic prosperity (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000) nor with the well-being of a
broader range of stakeholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001). Market power needs to be
contextualized within broader cultural and political institutions that constitute the social value of
brands and legitimate and enforce intellectual property rights.
One implication of viewing markets within institutional and ideological contexts is that
they are not the abstract, ahistorical constructions of economic theory; they can never be ‘free’.
The coffee case in this paper illustrates how GPN governance transitioned from a system based
on price and quantity regulation within a formal international agreement, to one that, ostensibly
at least, is more market based. This market, however, has been shaped and conditioned by the
struggle for control between coffee MNCs and developing country growers, the excess supply
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induced by World Bank policies and export promotion in Vietnam and Brazil, the growth of
premium and Fair Trade coffees, and industry self-regulation through codes of conduct. The
market is not necessarily more ‘free’ under the new mode of governance; rather, it operates
under a different matrix of forces and constraints.
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FOOTNOTES
1

Followers of the Austrian school of economists, most notably Ludwig von Mises (1985) and
Friedrich von Hayek (1944), would also decry the distorting impact of political intervention on
markets, though drawing very different implications. While Austrian school economists advocate
the necessity of isolating markets from politics, this paper suggests the impossibility of doing so.

2

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was a radical Italian political theorist, journalist, and activist. He
wrote The Prison Notebooks (1971) while imprisoned by Italy's Fascist government from 1926 to
1934.

3

The Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue is a network of more than 150 major North American
and European firms that works with government officials to reduce barriers to economic
integration and trade.
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